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and patches” (4), which is personality. Throughout, Reid writes clearly, in an entertaining
and engaging manner and with scholarly erudition. The book is a valuable reminder of the
important and broad contribution which Scots law makes to this evolving field.
Abbe E L Brown
University of Aberdeen
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Jacques du Plessis, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAWOF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT
Claremont: Juta (www.jutalaw.co.za), 2012. xliv + 436 pp. ISBN 9780702194740. R550.
It sometimes feels like the recognition of a South African general enrichment action has been
imminent for years. In fairness, the indications have been that such a judicial recognition was,
indeed, imminent. Law, however, has a stubborn tendency not to respect predictions: there
is still no judicially sanctioned “general enrichment action” in South Africa. Yet, at least, as
du Plessis explains, the judiciary have accepted the idea of a general action. Full recognition
seems tantalisingly close. Therefore, the challenge for South African text writers has been to
explain not only the characteristics of any emerging general action –which this text does in an
astonishingly accessible way; they have also had to identify how any such action might fit into
the existing legal landscape. That challenge dovetails with the broader, and admittedly more
venerable, need to make doctrinal space for the relatively recent development of enrichment
law as an independent discipline.
Scottish lawyers have much to gain from works like these, and not only because of a juridical
camaraderie flowing from being “mixed” legal systems at a general level. Affinities between the
two systems’ enrichment laws, and theorists, run deep. This text is a welcome adornment to
that comity. Furthermore, the relatively recent revamp of Scottish unjust(ified) enrichment
law, that culminated in Lord Rodger’s decision in Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725, has bestowed
a strikingly similar legacy: something that looks akin to a general enrichment action, but which
is, probably, not quite the real thing. That, at least, was the view advanced by Lord Rodger, who
was well placed to make the observation, writing extra-judicially in 2002. A Scottish lawyer, and
almost certainly lawyers from other jurisdictions, consulting this book will have reason to be
impressed and grateful in equal measure.
Du Plessis’s early discussion of the taxonomical implications of a general action, and the
different choices of perspective that the recognition of such an action would offer, is remarkable
for its clarity, and it frames the entire text admirably. Three conceptualisations are available
to frame the general action as it has developed so far. These contrast with the “traditional
approach”, which now seems passé, whereby the existence of a general action is dismissed
out of hand. The first option is to consider the general enrichment action to be subsidiary
and residual. A similar view might be taken of the use of the nemo debet locupletari ex
aliena jactura maxim in Scotland as a normative reservoir, as noted by Niall Whitty, but
not one that can be directly tapped. In effect the rules and requirements that underpin
existing actions that are grouped as “enrichment actions” endure untouched – the general
action is residual in that it appears only when facts emerge outside existing categories. Not
only are the existing categories untouched, they are accorded primacy over requirements that
may emerge from the general action – hence the subsidiary label. This view of the general
enrichment action, which appears to be that of the courts, accords primary importance to
continuity and perceived stability. However, as du Plessis notes, such a view has the potential for
bijuralism. A two-track law of enrichment could emerge, causing instability. The second option
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is to raise the general action to an all encompassing and exclusive status – any enrichment
action would rest upon the general action. Such an approach is perhaps superficially more
attractive, but entails replacing all that has gone before. To a Scottish lawyer such an approach
brings to mind David Sellar’s observations about how the apparently straightforward Shilliday
decision might, on one view, be seen to be doing violence to discretely developed actions.
“So be it”, as Sellar himself recognised, might be the refrain – sometimes eggs are broken
making an omelette. But judges can be reticent about departing from tried and tested
recipes –whether it be because they are worried about exactly what dish will emerge, or
they doubt their authority as the law’s sous chefs to make such a departure without express
authorisation from the legislature. Du Plessis shrewdly observes that previous attempts to
make a clean break have, in any event, normally ended with the recipe book being hurriedly
retrieved from the bin. Therefore, the third option is to fuse the general action with the
existing actions in a manner that retains a demarcated space between the two, but at the
same time interlinks them in a mutually reinforcing way. That is achieved by having the
general action as an almost ephemeral overarching rule, which can be observed manifest
in the existing actions. Scots lawyers familiar with developments here will recognise this
narrative as remarkably similar to the formidable rebranding exercise that can be observed
in both Lord Rodger’s judgment in Shilliday itself, and in the subsequent rationalisation of
that judgment by Niall Whitty, Daniel Visser, and by du Plessis himself in previous work.
Therefore, the Scottish enrichment lawyer using this book is immediately at home and attuned
to the tenor of the text. Those who are not intimately acquainted with high taxonomical
theory will benefit from the concision of du Plessis’s exposition of these conceptualisations
at the theoretical level and, perhaps more importantly, how these different understandings
and their implications define the substantive content of the operative rules within
enrichment law.
Important, and impressive, as the taxonomical explanations are for framing the text in a
Scottish context, the analyses of the particular constituents of enrichment law are profound.
Indeed, to say that the author’s learning is worn lightly would be clumsy for it is both
substantial and obvious. Only a flavour of it can be addressed here. Crucially, the overwhelming
characteristic of the whole text is the clarity it applies to difficult conceptual ideas. Deploying
the dominant civilian approach to dividing the study of enrichment law according to the mode
of a benefit’s conferral, that is to say by “transfer”, traditionally represented by the condictiones,
“imposition”, and “taking”, is not surprising; but the quality of the explanation is exceptional.
The discussion of enrichment by transfer would repay study for a Scottish lawyer, though
perhaps not as much as the discussion of enrichment by imposition: simply because Scottish
lawyers already have a discussion of enrichment by transfer, with Robin Evans-Jones’s excellent
Unjustified Enrichment, Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral: Condictio, that deals with the
condictiones in a way that is necessarily more calibrated to Scottish law. Amonograph treatment
of enrichment by imposition or taking is, however, lacking in Scotland – for the moment at least.
Of particular interest to a Scottish lawyer might be the discussion, in chapter 8, of imposed
enrichment and the “extended” or “impure” gestio – the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis. It
is open to question whether this action has been received into Scottish law: if it has – and it
remains a useful construct – this discussion will be extremely useful. Likewise, the discussion, in
chapter 11, of the interface between proprietary and enrichment in the context of enrichment
by taking can be readily transposed to the Scottish context.
There are different points of departure from those in Scottish law as well, such as how
the particular historical context of South Africa provides an opportunity to reflect upon the
potential for enrichment as a vehicle for reversing inequities of the past. The same might
have been said about the discussion of the omnipresence of the South African Constitution
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in doctrinal private law, but the emergence of a nascent human rights discourse in this country
means that this difference might not be as pronounced as it might once have been.
This text will be incredibly useful for academics and students engaged in advanced
undergraduate or postgraduate study –whether they are seeking guidance on Scottish law, or
for comparative study. Practitioners would also find the text useful for explaining elements of
enrichment law in Scotland, aided by the various references to Scottish law throughout the
text. Furthermore, the text could prove invaluable for those seeking to fill gaps in the existing
Scottish literature.
Daniel J Carr
University of Edinburgh
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THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW. Eds Jürgen
Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt, Reinhard Zimmermann with Andreas Stier
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2012. 2 Vols; Vol 1, xxxviii + 977 pp.; Vol 2,
xxxiv + 970 pp. ISBN 978019957895. £350.
The handsomely presented books which comprise this two volume set as published by Oxford
University Press are an updated, expanded and more internationally focussed English language
version of the excellent Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts (published by Mohr
Siebeck in 2009, edited by Basedow, Hopt, Zimmermann with Illmer). As the title suggests,
the text is concerned with European private law and has been prepared by the Hamburg
branch of the Max Planck Institute with assistance and additional contributions from equally
distinguished legal academics from elsewhere in Germany, greater Europe and also the United
States.
Volume 1 begins with “Abuse of a Dominant Position” and ends with “Interpretation of
Contracts”. Volume 2 begins with an entry concerning the “Interpretation of EU Law” and
closes with an entry upon the World Intellectual Property Organisation. The encyclopaedia
presents the reader with roughly 500 alphabetically arranged and cross-referenced entries
which each feature explanation and definition of the subject of the entry, an account of the
main academic opinions and (where present) mention of the academic and jurisprudential
controversies relating thereunto plus multi-lingual references to legal sources and also to
further multi-lingual readings. The entries, which happily are all alphabetically listed at the
front of each volume, are often fragmented along thematic lines so that a large subject (such
as Competition Law or Intellectual Property) can be better tackled by the relevant specialist
authors and also may better present the enquiring reader with detail upon the relevant aspect
of the enquiry at issue. The reader searching for “competition law” is presented with seven
discrete and successive entries under that specific name: Competition (Internal Market);
Competition Law (International); Competition Law (Private Enforcement); Competition
Law (Procedure); Competition Law (Relationship between European and National Law);
Competition Law (Sanctions); Competition Rules (Applicability).
The level of detail presented in each entry is most impressive given the necessary space
constraints. Each entry amounts to a brief scholarly article upon the particular subject of the
entry and typically covers several double column 56 line pages of carefully expressed academic
comment in what looks to be 10 point type: the crude average is a little less than four pages per
entry but naturally variations abound. The seven entries noted above concerning “Competition
Law” occupy twenty nine pages but this is by no means the end of the story as they are
